Yes, we did indeed see the newspaper headline “University sued by staff member because his pension wasn’t vegan”. If we may accept in context that the normal dietary preferences of pension funds are to seek maximum nourishment, rather than to focus upon a narrow range of potentially less nutritious menu choices, what did an employment tribunal make of this somewhat novel claim?
Mr X (who was granted anonymity) sued Manchester University and the Universities Superannuation Scheme after objecting to pension auto-enrolment: “the USS makes investment decisions that I and other vegans cannot accept.” The tribunal noted that despite his neurodiversity by reason of autism, and his refusal to engage with legal language, concepts and terminology, he was an articulate and thoughtful individual.
In applying to strike out his claim of indirect discrimination, the University explained that it was bound by law to enrol eligible job holders into a workplace pension scheme; that it was exclusively tied to USS; and that the USS fund was beneficial and affordable to staff. In turn, USS asserted that because it had acted in consequence of an enactment – namely, compulsory auto-enrolment – this was deemed not to comprise discrimination. It added that it was bound to make investment decisions that ensured the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of its portfolio as a whole.
The tribunal concurred and struck the claims out. Mr X was informed that the principal element of his claim, “the morality of the issue”, could not preclude the tribunal from applying the law as it currently stood. There was no scope to take note of the availability of Sharia compliant pension alternatives, which USS could apply to its Investment Builder options, because there were no comparable vegan pension funds on the market. Mr X could not insist that USS set up a special fund to meet his needs.
What enabled Mr X to bring his claim in the first place? The answer, the “philosophical belief” offshoot from the religious discrimination regime, which gave him a cause of action to contend that the “non-ethical investment decisions” put him and other ethical vegans at a particular disadvantage. It was evidently not in issue that Mr X’s ethical veganism belief was genuinely held; not a mere opinion; related to a substantial aspect of human life; possessed cogency and seriousness; and was worthy of respect in a democratic society. On this occasion, however, his cause of action was not enough.
Are you facing a philosophical belief dispute? Need any help in deciding whether to be accommodating, or polite but firm? Get in touch. Contact David Cooper on 07450 350715 or via david@wolverhamptonemploymentlaw.co.uk .
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